The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1994/94_514/94_514.zs

Text File | 1995-06-19 | 3.8 KB | 71 lines

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. GAUDIN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 94-514.   Argued April 17, 1995-Decided June 19, 1995

Respondent was charged with violating 18 U. S. C. 1001 by making
 false statements on Department of Housing and Urban Development
 (HUD) loan documents.  After instructing the jury that the Govern-
 ment had to prove, inter alia, that the alleged false statements were
 material to HUD's activities and decisions, the District Court added
 that the issue of materiality is a matter for the court to decide
 rather than the jury and that the statements in question were
 material.  The jury convicted respondent, but the Ninth Circuit
 reversed, holding that taking the question of materiality from the
 jury violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Held:  The trial judge's refusal to submit the question of -materiality-
 to the jury was unconstitutional.  Pp. 3-17.
  (a)  The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require criminal convictions
to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged.  Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U. S. ___, ___.  The Government concedes that
-materiality- is an element of the offense that the Government must
prove under 1001.  Pp. 3-5.
  (b)  The question whether the defendant's statement was material
to the federal agency's decision is the sort of mixed question of law
and fact that has typically been resolved by juries.  See, e.g., TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438, 450.  The Govern-
ment's position that the principle requiring the jury to decide all of
a crime's elements applies to only the essential elements' factual
components has no support in the case law.  Sparf v. United States,
156 U. S. 51, 90, and the other authorities on which the Govern-
ment relies, e.g., Sullivan, supra, at ___, all confirm that the jury's
constitutional responsibility is not merely to determine the facts, but
to apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate conclusion of
guilt or innocence.  Pp. 5-9.
  (c)  There is no consistent historical tradition to support the
Government's argument that, even if the jury generally must pass
on all of a crime's elements, there is an exception for materiality
determinations with respect to false statements in perjury prosecu-
tions (which are analogous to the determinations made in 1001
prosecutions).  There was no clear practice of having the judge
determine the materiality question in this country at or near the
time the Bill of Rights was adopted.  Indeed, state and federal cases
appear not to have addressed the question until the latter part of
the 19th century, at which time they did not display anything like
the virtual unanimity claimed by the Government.  Though uniform
postratification practice can shed light upon the meaning of an
ambiguous constitutional provision, the practice here is not uniform,
and the core meaning of the constitutional guarantees is unambigu-
ous.  Pp. 9-13.
  (d)  The Government's contention that stare decisis requires
respondent's constitutional claim to be denied is rejected.  Sinclair
v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 298, is overruled.  Kungys v. United
States, 485 U. S. 759, 772, distinguished.  Pp. 13-17.
28 F. 3d 943, affirmed.
 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  Rehn-
quist, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'Connor and
Breyer, JJ., joined.